Defendant [Defendant’s Name], by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully moves this Court to dismiss the charges against him/her on the grounds that the stop, detention, and search of his/her vehicle were unlawful, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In support of this motion, Defendant states as follows:
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On [date], at approximately [time], Defendant [Defendant’s Name] was driving on [Street/Highway Name] in [City, State], when Officer [Officer’s Name] initiated a traffic stop after observing that the registration tag on Defendant’s vehicle had expired by [number] of days.
Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer [Officer’s Name] claimed to detect the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Based solely on this alleged odor, the officer proceeded to search the vehicle without Defendant’s consent and without a warrant. During the search, Officer [Officer’s Name] discovered [alleged evidence], which led to Defendant’s arrest for [specific offense(s)]—charges unrelated to the initial reason for the stop.
Defendant asserts that although the officer may have had grounds to initiate a traffic stop for the expired tag, the officer’s claim of smelling marijuana is insufficient to justify a search under the Fourth Amendment, particularly in light of [state’s law regarding marijuana possession, if applicable] and the absence of any additional indicators of criminal activity. Therefore, all evidence obtained as a result of the search should be suppressed, and the case should be dismissed.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. A traffic stop constitutes a seizure, and it must be supported by reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred or that criminal activity is afoot. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Further, a warrantless search of a vehicle is only permissible if justified by probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925).
The Supreme Court has held that the smell of marijuana alone can, in some circumstances, provide probable cause to search a vehicle. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). However, the reasonableness of such a search depends on the totality of the circumstances, particularly when marijuana may be legal or decriminalized in certain forms or quantities under state law. As stated in Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013), the presence of an odor does not automatically justify a search without additional context.
III. ARGUMENT
A. The Stop Was Prolonged Beyond Its Justification Without Additional Reasonable Suspicion.
Officer [Officer’s Name] initially stopped Defendant’s vehicle for an expired registration tag, which provided limited justification for the stop. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer’s authority to seize a vehicle and its occupants is strictly limited to addressing the violation that initially prompted the stop. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). Tasks related to the traffic stop, such as checking the driver’s license, registration, and issuing a citation, should have concluded the encounter.
Here, Officer [Officer’s Name] did not immediately resolve the traffic violation but instead claimed to smell marijuana, which prolonged the detention and resulted in a search. There is no indication that the officer observed any additional suspicious behavior beyond the alleged odor. In cases where the initial stop is for a minor infraction, such as an expired tag, any extension of the stop requires separate reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985).
B. The Alleged Odor of Marijuana Does Not Automatically Establish Probable Cause in Light of Changing Marijuana Laws.
While courts have historically upheld that the smell of marijuana may justify a warrantless vehicle search, the legal landscape surrounding marijuana has evolved significantly in recent years. Many states, including [state], have decriminalized or legalized the possession and use of marijuana in certain forms or quantities. In such jurisdictions, the mere odor of marijuana does not automatically provide probable cause for a search. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barr, 240 A.3d 1263 (Pa. 2020), where the court held that the odor of marijuana, by itself, was insufficient to establish probable cause in a state where marijuana had been partially legalized.
In [state], where possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use has been [legalized/decriminalized/partially legal], the mere smell of marijuana is not necessarily indicative of illegal activity. Without additional factors, such as observable impairment, possession of large quantities, or evidence of other criminal behavior, the smell alone is insufficient to justify a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Zuniga, 372 P.3d 1052 (Colo. 2016), where the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the odor of marijuana was no longer indicative of criminal activity due to the state’s legalization of marijuana.
Here, Officer [Officer’s Name] did not observe any such additional indicators of illegal activity. Defendant was not displaying signs of impairment, there was no visible contraband, and there was no traffic violation beyond the expired tag. The officer’s search was therefore based solely on the odor of marijuana, which, in the context of [state’s law], did not provide the probable cause necessary to justify a search of the vehicle.
C. The Warrantless Search Was Unlawful, and the Evidence Must Be Suppressed.
Because the search of Defendant’s vehicle was based solely on the officer’s subjective claim of smelling marijuana and lacked probable cause under the totality of the circumstances, it was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment requires that warrantless searches of vehicles be justified by probable cause, and in this case, the alleged odor of marijuana was insufficient to meet this requirement.
As a result, any evidence obtained as a result of the search is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule, as established in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), prohibits the use of evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches and seizures. Furthermore, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine mandates that any derivative evidence discovered as a result of the unlawful search also be suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).
D. The Unlawful Search Necessitates Dismissal of the Charges.
Without the evidence obtained during the unlawful search, the prosecution cannot meet its burden of proving the charges against Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Courts have consistently dismissed charges when the prosecution’s evidence is suppressed due to a Fourth Amendment violation. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 322 S.W.3d 791 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010), where the court held that suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence rendered the prosecution’s case insufficient to proceed.
Since the alleged contraband discovered during the search is the sole basis for the charges against Defendant, the suppression of this evidence leaves the prosecution without sufficient evidence to sustain its case. As such, the charges against Defendant should be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant respectfully requests that this Honorable Court grant this Motion to Dismiss and suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful search of Defendant’s vehicle. The search was conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the charges against Defendant [Defendant’s Name] should be dismissed as the prosecution cannot sustain its case without the illegally obtained evidence.
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